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Accounting for Violence at the
Victoria Industrial School
BRYAN HOGEVEEN*
Boys who were inmates at the Victoria Industrial School (VIS) from its opening in
1887 to its closure in 1934 often suffered extreme, violent, and capricious penalties
and encountered calculated psychological manipulation. The violence they
experienced and the justifications school officials put forward to account for such
injurious practices are explored through case files, public investigations, newspaper
reports, revelations from former inmates, defensive statements given by superinten-
dents, and confessions by staff. Exploration of these sources suggests that, despite
repeated recommendations from Toronto City Council, the public, and commissions
of inquiry, violent penalties persisted. Despite claims to the contrary, the VIS was,
for many boys, a cruel and merciless institution.
Les garc¸ons qui ont e´te´ de´tenus a` la Victoria Industrial School (VIS) entre son ouver-
ture en 1887 et sa fermeture en 1934 subissaient souvent des chaˆtiments extreˆmes, vio-
lents et capricieux et faisaient fait l’objet de manipulations psychologiques calcule´es.
La violence qui leur e´tait faite et les motifs qu’invoquaient les repre´sentants de
l’e´cole pour justifier de telles pratiques pre´judiciables sont examine´s par l’entremise
de dossiers de cas, d’enqueˆtes publiques, de reportages dans les journaux, de re´ve´-
lations d’anciens de´tenus, de de´clarations de´fensives par les directeurs et de confes-
sions par le personnel. L’e´tude de ces sources semble indiquer qu’en de´pit de
recommandations re´pe´te´es du conseil municipal de Toronto, du public et de commis-
sions d’enqueˆte, les chaˆtiments violents persiste`rent. Malgre´ les affirmations du con-
traire, la VIS a e´te´, pour bien des garc¸ons, un e´tablissement cruel et impitoyable.
THE VICTORIA Industrial School (VIS) opened its doors in 1887 in Mimico,
Ontario (located 20 kilometres west of Toronto), with the intention of reform-
ing wayward boys, preventing their further deviance, and inculcating self-
control. Annual reports suggest these goals were peacefully pursued through
a progressive and patient reform programme, which included farm and indus-
trial training, education, religious instruction, and recreation. Such reports paint
a pleasant portrait of an irenic and amicable existence within institutional walls.
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This annual accounting, however, obscures the institutional underbelly, which,
when exposed, reveals a violent and at times brutal ethos.1
Punishments and penalties experienced by boys at the VIS often
exceeded what can easily be grouped under corporal punishment, insti-
tutional training, or force. Michel Foucault maintained that cultivation of
“proper” subjectivities proceeds most effectively through painstakingly
slow and subtle manipulation of the soul.2 Emile Durkheim, for his part,
was convinced that “proper” training and education does not invoke the
fear of sanctions to curb violations of the rule. Instead, like Foucault, he
maintained that training must be a creative and subtle power that works
through a deliberate process and subtle manipulation.3 Violence possesses
little of discipline’s creative, slow, or subtle character. Rather it is
immediate, destructive, and rooted in the antecedent causative condition.
Beyond servility, resentment, and fear, little is created. It is, as Durkheim
articulates, essentially “expiation.”4 Although VIS officials found it an
effective means through which to maintain order, intimidation through
violence does little to (re)shape pernicious behaviour: in fact, just the
opposite may result. W. H. Auden writes: “I and the public know, what
all schoolchildren learn, those to whom evil is done, Do evil in return.”5
Of note are three separate, but interconnected, events during which the
violence of VIS staff and officials became an object of public scrutiny. First
was Superintendent Donald McKinnon’s “inquisitorial method.” To ferret
out sexual misconduct, the superintendent queried inmates accused of
wrongdoing with purposely vague questions, such as “what have you to
tell me?” Adamant boys were advised to prepare for a beating.
Confronted thus and out of fear, boys inevitably not only confessed
their own wrongdoing, but implicated other inmates in pernicious
conduct. Second, during 1912, the violence confronting inmates received
1 For a more detailed discussion of the VIS reform programme, see Paul Bennett, “Taming ‘Bad Boys’
of the Dangerous Class: Child Rescue and Restraint at the Victoria Industrial School, 1887–1935,”
Histoire sociale/ Social History, vol. 21, no. 41 (May 1988), pp. 71–94, and “Turning Bad Boys into
Good Citizens: The Reforming Impulse of Toronto’s Industrial Schools Movement, 1883 to the
1920s,” Ontario History, vol. 78, no. 2 (1986), pp. 210–232; Bryan Hogeveen, “‘You will hardly
believe I turned out so well’: Parole, Surveillance, Masculinity and the Victoria Industrial School,
1896–1935,” Histoire sociale/ Social History, vol. 37, no. 74 (November 2004), pp. 201–229, and
“‘Can’t You be a Man?’ Rebuilding Wayward Masculinities and Regulating Juvenile Deviance in
Ontario, 1860–1930” (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 2003); Charlotte Neff, “The
Ontario Industrial Schools Act of 1874,” Canadian Journal of Family Law, vol. 12, no. 1 (1999),
pp. 171–189.
2 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1977).
3 Emile Durkheim, Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of
Education (New York: MacMillan, 1925).
4 Ibid., p. 182.
5 Wystan Hugh Auden, “September 1, 1939” [poem from online source], retrieved September 12, 2006
from http://www.esrnational.org/september1_1939annotated.htm.
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considerable public attention as a result of the actions of Mrs. Fredrick
Spain. After visiting her son (Wilbert) and witnessing the conditions of
his restraint (he was handcuffed to a bed) as well as physical evidence
of an extreme beating, Mrs. Spain contacted the Toronto Daily Star to
voice her disgust. On this occasion, the provincial government conducted
an inquiry. Third, in 1927 institutional violence became once again an issue
for public scrutiny during an investigation by a committee of city aldermen
into the death of a former inmate (James Brawn), which exposed the bru-
tality inmates suffered at the hands of VIS staff. While the committee did
not find cause for considerable concern, A. J. Scott, a VIS night-watchman
and a devout Christian, felt duty-bound to confess what he knew.
Superintendents and staff deployed a number of narrative techniques to
account for their violent acts. Giving an account of oneself typically
presupposes that the self has an intimate connection to the suffering of
some “other.”6 Such accounts are interlocutory means through which indi-
viduals attend to or address an “other” who has accused them of immor-
ality, illegality, or violence.7 They thus contain the a priori demand of an
outside agent who requests an evaluation of behaviour falling beyond
prevailing normative boundaries. If I am to give an account, it is always
to someone whom I hope to influence in accordance with my interpret-
ation of events. Clearly, not all narrative takes this form, but an account
that follows from allegation must, a priori, accept that the self, the I, has
causal agency, even if that instance can be satisfactorily explained.
Accounts given by VIS officials accused of violence attempted to span
the fracture between their conduct and normativity. Toward this end,
superintendents and staff claimed that they followed directions to elimin-
ate “filthy habits,” to stamp out inmate violence, to maintain institutional
order, to reveal inmate secrets, to keep boys from escaping, to imprint
morality lessons, and, most conspicuously, to quell a state of emergency.
When discussing accounts it is useful to distinguish between excuses and
justifications. To begin, excuses are accounts wherein an accused fully
admits the immorality of the act being called into question, but shirks
full responsibility through appeal to socially approved vocabularies.8
According to John Austin, excuses either deny intent, recklessness, or neg-
ligence.9 We are daily confronted by and deploy a deluge of excuses —
6 An account is not required for that which acquiesces with the established order. Staff who acted
according to routine and common sense were rarely asked to explain their conformity. That is,
while conduct connected to training, discipline, and correction was not subject to intense scrutiny
and demands for an account, violence and abuse certainly were.
7 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham Press, 2005).
8 M. B. Scott and S. M. Lyman, “Accounts,” American Sociological Review, vol. 33, no. 1 (1968),
pp. 46–62.
9 John Austin, “A Plea for Excuses” in Philosophical Papers, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1979), pp. 175–204.
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“Wasn’t me!” “My dog ate it.” “I have three other papers due.” “Did you
see what she was wearing?” — to (re)cite but a few. Justifications, by con-
trast, are put forward by an individual who accepts responsibility for a vio-
lation, but in the face of extenuating circumstances denies the act’s
pejorative quality. Thus, if the good that accrues from a certain course
(such as speeding to get my labouring wife to the hospital) outweighs
the harm (disobeying the posted speed limit), deviance can be justified.
However, I would have greater difficulty justifying endangering her life
and those of others to get to the hockey game before the opening face-
off. Justifications, in opposition to excuses, appeal to normative rightness
wherein the guilty not only rationalizes conduct, but maintains that it
deserves positive points and perhaps thanks (for example, getting to the
hospital in time).
Intended as a contribution to the social history of the institutional
governance of youth in Canada, this study highlights the violence
male inmates at the VIS endured and the justifications officials
offered to account for their injurious practices. It is based on case
files, public investigations of VIS practices, newspaper reports, revel-
ations from former inmates, defensive statements given by superinten-
dents, and confessions by staff. Exploration of these sources suggests
that, notwithstanding repeated recommendations from Toronto City
Council, the public, and commissions of inquiry, the VIS’s brand of
violent penalty persisted. Inmates suffered extreme, violent, and capri-
cious penalties and encountered calculated psychological manipulation.
Despite claims to the contrary, the VIS was, for many boys, a cruel
and merciless institution.
The VIS and its Inmates
Before moving to a discussion of the coercive penalties VIS inmates
experienced, it is instructive to examine the boys’ demographic profile.
A partial portrait of this population can be painted from the sample of
523 cases I drew from the VIS case books and registers for the years
1887 to 1929.10 The most obvious conclusion is that boys incarcerated at
the school grew up in families that struggled to maintain even a basic econ-
omic existence in the face of uncertain financial times, war, and family
instability. Boys’ fathers were employed in a variety of occupations, the
common denominator being that their work was predominantly low-
paying and short on prestige. Their fathers were night watchmen, cooks
on boats, carpenters, railroad labourers, chimney sweeps, bartenders,
butchers, and upholsterers. Given the nature of these occupations, it is
likely that many boys who arrived at the industrial school were familiar
10 Archive of Ontario [hereafter AO], Industrial Schools Association of Toronto [ISAT] Record Group
[RG] 8–51–7, Victoria Industrial School Case Books, 1887–1929.
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with privation. Fathers’ employment was rarely sufficient. In many cases,
mothers were compelled to take on menial employment as domestics
and washwomen.11
To adapt to economic uncertainty, many parents encouraged their chil-
dren to find work. From my sample, 43 per cent of boys were employed at
some occupation before arriving at the industrial school. Tasks allocated to
boys differed from those typically assigned to girls. Ruth Alexander has
argued that many working-class daughters living in New York during
the first three decades of the twentieth century took on waitressing,
factory work, and domestic labour to relieve their families’ economic
burden.12 Working-class boys in Toronto took on a variety of disparate,
but similarly unskilled jobs. They worked as newsboys, as delivery boys,
in print shops, in poolrooms, as pin-setters, and at making hats.
Although the types of jobs changed over time, farm work (30 per cent),
messenger jobs (30 per cent), and factory labour (11 per cent) were con-
sistently among the most common forms of employment.13
By the turn of the twentieth century, the great majority of boys arriving
at the VIS (unlike girls of a similar age in comparable girls’ reformatories)
had been convicted of criminal offences.14 As Table 1 illustrates, by 1910
two-thirds of commitments to the school were for crime; by 1921 that
number had risen to 82 per cent.15 For this class of boys, superintendent
Chester Ferrier explained in 1909, the official crime markers might just
measure the tip of the proverbial iceberg. “[Ask] him how many times
he was guilty of theft and not found out and he frequently confesses to
many,” the superintendent explained.16 Ferrier was astonished by the
number of times a boy could commit theft and escape detection. Of the
474 cases from my sample in which information was entered, 79 per cent
of the boys had been convicted of a criminal offence before being admitted
to the VIS, the most often cited being theft. Clearly, boys admitted to the
VIS were well acquainted with criminality.17
11 AO, ISAT, RG 8–51–7, Case Books.
12 Ruth Alexander, The Girl Problem: Female Sexual Delinquency in New York, 1900–1929
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 14–17. The girls in her sample shared very
similar characteristics to the boys discussed here.
13 AO, ISAT, RG 8–51–7, Case Books.
14 Tamara Myers has argued that offences against the sexual and moral order were the main reason
girls were incarcerated at the Girls’ Cottage Industrial School in Montreal. Tamara Myers,
Caught: Montreal’s Modern Girls and the Law, 1869–1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2006).
15 AO, ISAT, RG 8–51–5, Miscellaneous, Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Ontario
Government, April 16, 1912. Bennett (“Taming Bad Boys”) and Neff (“The Ontario Industrial
Schools Act”) make similar points in their work.
16 AO, ISAT, Annual Report, 1909, p. 18.
17 AO, ISAT, RG 8–51–7, Case Books.
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Boys who entered the VIS were typically members of poor families,
shirked their school obligations, and had been convicted of at least one
criminal offence.18 Parents, police, judges, and Children’s Aid Society
(CAS) agents agreed these boys had violated respectable conduct and
required measures to correct their corrupt characters. How did the VIS
attempt to alter the boys’ wayward course? To this end, the VIS boasted
a six-pronged attack on juvenile deviance that included instruction in
drill, industrial training, farming, education, religion, and athletics.19
School officials promised to recreate wayward youth into men who
found employment in the country, attended church, resisted temptations,
and obeyed their parents. In short, the VIS disciplinary strategy attempted
to mould boys into the nineteenth-century masculine ideal.20 Religious
instruction taught self-control; sports instilled ways to temper aggression
with restraint; industrial training created breadwinners; and drill encour-
aged the militaristic values of obedience, respect, and self-discipline.21
School officials were convinced this brand of masculine training would
prepare boys to be heads of working-class families and for respectable
life in the community or (preferably) on farms.22
Alongside this form of masculine training, we must consider how cor-
poral punishment reinforced institutional order and appropriate manly
patterns of behaviour. Throughout history there have been populations
Table 1: Rationale for Commitment to VIS, 1898–1927
Year of commitment
Rationale 1898 1900 1902 1906 1910 1917 1921 1924 1927
Incorrigibility 36 24 28 38 44 58 14 21 22
Larceny 12 30 32 37 69 98 46 39 49
Burglary 0 0 0 3 6 0 8 19 37
Vagrancy 0 1 4 8 14 0 0 2 0
Assault 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 4
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 2 3 0 6 0 0
Totals 48 55 64 89 137 156 75 84 112
Source: The evidence provided for these years is representative of the information
presented in the VIS Annual Reports, 1898–1927. See also Bennett, “Taming
Bad Boys,” p. 80.
18 Ibid.
19 Hogeveen, “‘You will hardly believe I turned out so well’.”
20 Ibid.; Hogeveen, “Can’t You be a Man?”
21 Hogeveen, “‘You will hardly believe I turned out so well’.”
22 Despite structural shifts in conceptions of normative working-class masculinity, the VIS did not
radically alter its reform programme to coincide with these alterations (Hogeveen, “Can’t You be
a Man?”).
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for whom violent penalties (such as birching or whipping) were considered
not only acceptable, but required. Swaggering boys have traditionally been
regarded as particularly appropriate candidates. In a recent article that
considers discourses of corporal punishment manifested in mid-twentieth-
century Canadian prison investigations, Carolyn Strange suggests that
committee members in two major governmental inquiries implicitly
agreed that treating men’s and women’s bodies differently was a critical
benchmark of modern civility.23 Strange goes on to explain that “the
visibility of the female body and its sensational exposure in the act” of cor-
poral punishment to the male gaze partly explains gendered sensibilities
regarding its use.24 Evidently, boys’ bodies were not regarded in the
same way as those belonging to women and girls. Whether as students
in public schools or as inmates of institutions, deviant boys have consist-
ently been included among categories considered most deserving of a
good caning.25
Physical penalty possesses little of what Foucault deemed discipline’s
“positive” or creative quality. According to Foucault’s influential treatise
on the prison, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, disci-
pline centred on the soul largely displaced the infliction of pain on or
to the body. That inmates of the VIS were on the receiving end of cor-
poral punishments should come as a surprise to strict adherents of
Foucault’s work. Boys were routinely subjected to corporal punishment
well into the twentieth century, qualifying Foucault’s contention that by
the turn of the nineteenth century “one no longer touched the body.”26
Despite repeated recommendations to curtail its use, the school’s brand
of violent penalty continued relatively unchallenged. However, by the
1890s, some citizens of Toronto found the VIS’s use of corporal
punishment quite unsettling.
23 Carolyn Strange, “The Undercurrents of Penal Culture: Punishment of the Body in Mid-Twentieth
Century Canada,” Law and History Review, vol. 19 (2001), pp. 343–387.
24 Ibid., p. 367.
25 For example, see J. Bennell, “Invisible Wounds: Corporal Punishment in British Schools as a Form of
Ritual,” Child Abuse and Neglect, vol. 15 (1991), pp. 377–388; M. Boes, “The Treatment of Juvenile
Delinquents in Early Modern Germany: A Case Study,” Continuity and Change, vol. 11 (1996),
pp. 43–60; P. Gardner, “The Giant at the Front: Young Teachers and Corporal Punishment in
Inter-war Elementary Schools,” History of Education, vol. 25 (1996), pp. 141–163; D. Oberwittler,
“From Punishment to Education? Changing Penal Responses to Juvenile Delinquency in Late
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England and Germany Compared,” Comenius, vol. 16
(1986), pp. 7–25; B. Simpson, “Moderate and Reasonable? The Early History and Administrative
Regulation of Corporal Punishment in Victorian State Schools,” History of Education Review, vol.
25 (1996), pp. 23–35; W. Watterson, “Chips off the Old Block: Birching, Social Class and the
English Public Schools,” Nineteenth Century Studies, vol. 10 (1986), pp. 93–110.
26 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 11. See also Strange, “The Undercurrents of Penal Culture”;
Watterson, “Chips off the Old Block.”
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“Not for what one has done, but for what one knows”
VIS Superintendent Donald J. McKinnon’s tenure at the VIS’s helm was
punctuated by frequent battles with the Public School Inspector from
Toronto, James Hughes. Mrs. Warburton, one of the school’s teachers,
furnished the inspector with intimate institutional knowledge. It turns
out that Warburton and McKinnon frequently battled over institutional
policy. Their mutual animosity reached a climax when Warburton wrote
a number of damning letters to Hughes showcasing what she perceived
to be the superintendent’s inadequacies. In addition to some of the
more general charges, Warburton accused the superintendent of speaking
untruths in boys’ presence and failing to secure his officers’ confidence.
According to Warbuton, McKinnon never cooperated with them in
attempting to secure order, and they had known him to pervert the
truth to serve his own purposes.27 Perhaps the most damaging of
Warbuton’s challenges concerned the superintendent’s violent system of
punishment. The teacher charged that the superintendent inflicted and
sanctioned a system of “punishments injurious to the [boys’] health.”28
Under considerable pressure from Hughes and Warburton, McKinnon
vacated his position in 1893.
In an essay entitled “A Defence,” McKinnon responded to allegations of
violence and cruelty by relaying the sequencing of events as he interpreted
them. While historians can never be certain whether and by whom
McKinnon’s confessions were read, I am convinced it was studied with con-
siderable interest by, at the very least, the Industrial Schools Association of
Toronto (ISAT). Indeed, “A Defence” was addressed to “the members of
the Toronto Public School Board, and of the Industrial Schools Association
of Toronto.” Whether the 27-page document was disseminated beyond
these two groups remains unclear. A copy of the document made its way
into the library collection of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education.
Before probing McKinnon’s essay more fully, it is important to pause to
inquire about how an individual becomes positioned as one who must give
an account. Nietzsche maintained that we give accounts only when inter-
pellated as beings rendered accountable by external judges. If Nietzsche
is right, I provide an account of my conduct because someone has called
attention to it and demanded an explanation. In response and on the
defensive, the a priori guilty individual attempts to reconstruct his or her
action in light of a specific charge. For Nietzsche, imputation demands
27 Toronto, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education Library, Donald J. McKinnon, “The Victoria
Industrial School and its Late Superintendent: A Defence,” n.p. McKinnon also accused Mrs.
Warburton of wrongdoing; her influence was not always “of a nature to make the most lasting
impression on the character of our boys, she refused to make her home in the school and it was
not in the best interests of the school that a staff member make confidential reports to Hughes.”
28 McKinnon, “A Defence.”
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that we reflect upon ourselves and the innermost processes intertwined
with the events under scrutiny.29 It was in this spirit that McKinnon
narrated his seemingly violent approach to maintaining institutional
order. Such an account takes a narrative form that depended upon
McKinnon’s authoritative ability to narrate linkages between events and
his involvement, being directed, as it were in this case, toward persuasion.
In “A Defence,” McKinnon appears reflective, as if he were taking his
tenure at the helm of the VIS as an object of rumination. Nevertheless,
he also comes across as attempting to render intelligible to those awaiting
his account how he could possibly rationalize his conduct. By narrating his
account in public form, he seemed fully aware that an audience expected
an allocution for what he had done and for what reason.30 Indeed, as
McKinnon was giving an account of himself, he was not solely offering a
narrative through what may be considered an objective medium. Rather,
the account was an act, a performance for another as an allocutory deed.31
Sections of McKinnon’s defence dealing with his methods and rationales
for punishing deviant boys are instructive for what they reveal about insti-
tutional violence. Although boys’ heterosexual activities were not policed
outside the institution to the same extent as was the case for girls, homo-
sexual conduct among boys inside the VIS was one activity that staff con-
demned swiftly and decisively.32 Unlike the situation documented by
Sharon Myers with respect to the Industrial Home of East St. John, attend-
ants at the VIS maintained strict and continuous surveillance over the
entire inmate population at night to counter “pernicious” sexuality.33
Feminist historians such as Michelle Cale have suggested that, because
girls were defined in terms of their sexuality before they entered female
reformatories, officials merely continued this practice.34 Similarly, in their
29 Fredrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage, 1967),
pp. 81–87.
30 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself.
31 Ibid.
32 As work by Steven Maynard, Gary Kinsman, and others has convincingly demonstrated, this does
not mean that homosexual relations were ignored by police. See, for example, Steven Maynard,
“Through a Hole in the Lavatory Wall: Homosexual Subcultures, Police Surveillance and the
Dialectics of Discovery, Toronto, 1890–1930,” Journal of the History of Sexuality, vol. 5, no. 2
(1994), pp. 207–242, and “Horrible Temptations: Sex, Man and Working Class Male Youth in
Urban Ontario, 1890–1935,” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 78, no. 2 (1997), pp. 191–235; Gary
Kinsman, The Regulation of Desire: Sexuality in Canada (Montreal: Black Rose, 1987).
33 Sharon Myers, “Revenge and Revolt: The Boys’ Industrial Home of East Saint John in the Inter-war
Period” in Hilary Thompson, ed., Children’s Voices in Atlantic Literature and Culture: Essays on
Childhood (Guelph, ON: Canadian Children’s Press, 1995). Myers points out that not until an
investigation was conducted in 1929 was night supervision conducted, a situation greatly resented
by the inmates.
34 Michelle Cale, “Girls and the Perception of Sexual Danger in the Victorian Reformatory System,”
History, vol. 78 (1993), p. 215.
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study of girls’ resistance to the attempts of reform schools to regulate
their wayward conduct, Tamara Myers and Joan Sangster provide
evidence that sexual behaviour among delinquent girls was met with
suspension of privileges or silence on the part of nuns who ran the insti-
tution.35 For boys, coercive sexual regulation began once they entered
the institution, where the facility’s staff was ever vigilant to detect any
hint of sexual conduct among inmates. Institutional officials such as
Superintendent McKinnon regarded sexual conduct among inmates
to be a direct affront to institutional order and wider normative
structures of heterosexual masculinity. In testimony before the 1891
Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the Prison and Reformatory
System of Ontario, he stated:
A: There has been evil in the dormitories. That was about two years ago.
Q: You refer to masturbation?
A: Yes, and boys getting into the beds with each other.36
Boys who engaged in same-sex conduct within the walls of the VIS met
with psychological manipulation and, at times, violence.37 To ferret out this
type of behaviour, McKinnon employed an “inquisitorial method” that he
rationalized by appeals to the greater institutional good of eradicating
illicit sex. It was inaugurated one eventful evening after McKinnon had
been summoned to settle a quarrel that had erupted between two boys.
To his dismay, McKinnon discovered that one of the boys had accused
the other of “very filthy practices” that he considered much worse than
simple masturbation. When accused of the crime, the guilty boy confessed
his involvement and implicated another boy.38 McKinnon was concerned
about how far this trouble had infiltrated the institution. Placing the first
two quarrelling offenders in a room under guard, he sent for other
inmates implicated in the so-called filthy habits. Once he was able to
draw out further names from the third boy, he similarly detained him
and sent for yet another. This process continued until all implicated
35 Tamara Myers and Joan Sangster, “Retorts, Runaways and Riots: Patterns of Resistance in Canadian
Reform Schools for Girls,” Journal of Social History, vol. 34, no. 4 (2001), p. 670.
36 Ontario, Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the Prison and Reformatory System
of Ontario, 1891 (Toronto: Warwick & Sons, 1891), p. 478.
37 By focusing attention on an institution that detained working-class boys, I am not suggesting that
sexual relations were not found in institutions housing their middle- and upper-class counterparts.
For discussions of sexual conduct among middle-class boys, see: Alan Hunt, Governing Morals: A
Social History of Moral Regulation (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and “The Great
Masturbation Panic and the Discourses of Moral Regulation in Nineteenth-Century Britain,”
Journal of the History of Sexuality, vol. 8, no. 4 (1998), pp. 575–615; Jean Barman, Growing up
British in British Columbia: Boys in Private School (Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press, 1984).
38 McKinnon, “A Defence.”
156 Histoire sociale / Social History
boys were betrayed. To each and all interrogated, McKinnon framed his
question in the same way: “Tell me anything you know of that’s very
bad.” Such an interrogation was designed to elicit a response that would
condemn not only the confessor, but others as well. Accused boys who
did not acknowledge responsibility would, according to McKinnon, be
“quietly told to prepare for punishment.”39
Interrogated boys confronted a rather disagreeable double bind: confes-
sion prompted severe whipping; silence suggested complicity and incited
violence. To force the recalcitrant to own up to their wrongs, or the
wrongs of others, McKinnon thrashed silent boys until useful information
was forthcoming. However, the superintendent rationalized in “A
Defence,” punishment was rarely necessary. Boys were generally willing
to confess things previously unknown to him.40 Violence, or the threat of
violence, uncovered the confessor’s hidden knowledge — or knowledge
the boy fabricated to avoid thrashing. According to McKinnon, his
initial foray into inquisitorial methods was long, drawn-out, and (he ration-
alized) ultimately successful. The inaugural event lasted close to 24 hours
and concluded only after the last boy had confessed. According to
McKinnon’s unofficial tally, the result of his examination yielded “78
boys out of 115 [he interrogated] had confessed themselves or had been
proved guilty of sodomy, French vice or masturbation.”41
The accounts boys provided cannot be divided from the interlocutory
scene in which they were elicited. Thus we are right to enquire whether
the boys told the truth about themselves and the knowledge they pos-
sessed, or merely responded to the demands of McKinnon’s interrogation
and the potential threats to their bodies. It seems that offering rumour and
innuendo as truth served the purpose as well as, or perhaps better than,
telling the putative truth. Indeed, as Foucault maintains in his last lectures,
confession impels a certain “manifestation” of the self that does not
necessarily correspond to an inner truth, but whose constitutive truth
can neither be taken as mere illusion.42 Rather, the confession in this
instance is a speech act in which the inmate makes himself appear for
another. That is, the decisive element is not that McKinnon now knew
the “truth” about boys’ conduct. “It is the confession, the verbal act of
confession, which comes last and which makes appear . . . the truth, the
reality of what has happened.”43 The verbal confession was the fulfilment
and manifestation of a truth already established.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Michel Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France (New York: Picador,
2005).
43 Ibid., p. 178
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McKinnon’s narrative did not deny his actions. Rather, the former
superintendent was adamant that, while he was indeed responsible for
the “inquisitorial method,” the boys’ conduct not only permitted but
demanded such a violent response. McKinnon’s narrative attempted to
establish a link between his conduct and the boys’ suffering in a way
that absolved him of ultimate responsibility. Put more rigorously,
McKinnon’s inquisitorial system, he reassured his readers, served a
purpose beyond mere punishment: by breaking down the inmate subcul-
ture of silence, it uncovered boys’ secrets, punished wrongdoing, and
stamped out sexual and other forms of deviance. More importantly, he
argued, such practices maintained institutional equilibrium and forced
sexual restraint on the inmates.44
McKinnon’s essay produced and established the superintendent as justi-
fied in his deployment of violence to stamp out malignance. It seems to
have pacified his critics. As far as the historical record reveals, no legal
action was ever taken against McKinnon or his staff for employing the
dubiously titled “inquisitorial method.” While McKinnon’s tenure was
never the subject of formal investigation, his successor, Superintendent
Ferrier, was scrutinized on two separate occasions when the violence
inmates suffered became public.
“Ain’t I gettin’ skinny, mother?”
While McKinnon trained his sights on so-called “filthy habits,” under
Ferrier’s tenure leaving the institution without permission was considered
a grave offence that demanded a similarly severe response. Tamara Myers
and Joan Sangster argue that running away was not only the most active
form of reaction to an oppressive institutional structure; it was the most
common.45 Since the VIS did not employ a full-time chaplain, the route
taken to church on Sundays presented inmates with optimum conditions
to make their break. As inmates were paraded through the streets of
Mimico to attend religious services, they could be relatively certain that
the few staff present would not be able to apprehend and then restrain
them. Other boys, such as Chuck I., showed greater ingenuity. Chuck
informed his teacher he was not feeling well. “Go to the School’s hospital
and wait for a nurse,” his teacher told him. His sickness was a ruse. Taking
a key he had somehow lifted from an unsuspecting attendant, he simply let
himself out the front door. Chuck was never located again.46 Wilbert Spain,
however, would not be so fortunate.47
44 McKinnon, “A Defence.”
45 Myers and Sangster, “Retorts, Runaways, and Riots”; see also Myers, “Revenge and Revolt.”
46 AO, ISAT, RG 8–51–8, Case Files.
47 Ibid. Since a public inquiry was called to investigate his case, I have used this boy’s real name.
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An inquiry held during late February and early March of 1912 demanded
that Chester Ferrier — the longest-serving VIS superintendent — account
for his disgraceful treatment of inmates. Allegations by Mrs. Fredrick
W. Spain that her 15-year-old son Wilbert had been the victim of violent
and draconian penalties at Ferrier’s hands triggered the investigation. Mrs.
Spain formally complained that “her son, Wilbert Spain, after running
away from the VIS several times was returned to the School on 9
January, and on that day was ordered by the superintendent to be put to
bed with handcuffs placed on his ankles.” During Wilbert’s punishment,
the superintendent had whipped him with a strap on the bare back and
legs while he was chained to a bed. For a month and four days, Wilbert
was compelled to wear handcuffs on his ankles and was fed a diet of
bread and water.48
Mrs. Spain visited her son while he was under restraint and was under-
standably outraged after encountering his battered body. As a result of
extreme beatings and deprivation of proper nourishment, Mrs. Spain
found her son’s backside was covered with welts and that he had lost con-
siderable weight. She wanted answers. Mrs. Spain then contacted Ferrier,
J. J. Kelso, the Superintendent of Neglected and Dependent Children,
the Toronto Daily Star, and G. Tower, chairman of the VIS board of man-
agement, to secure an investigation into the punishment her son had been
forced to endure. Mr. Tower questioned the nature of Wilbert’s injuries.
He did not think the “boy had been so severely punished as the report
made out.”49 Perhaps, Tower rationalized, the report was the result of “a
mother’s hysterics.” Other members of the VIS board took the allegations
made by Mrs. Spain with a “grain of salt.” Mr. Hendry, for example, pre-
ferred to side with Ferrier. He stated, “I do not know the boy in question,
but I do know the School and I have every confidence in Mr. Ferrier.”50
Kelso, too, found Mrs. Spain’s account extremely difficult to reconcile.
Although Wilbert had been tied up, Kelso reassured the newspaper repor-
ter that the inmate was not suffering. Even if he was, Kelso maintained that
some boys and some situations required a degree of force reserved for the
worst possible cases. Besides, Kelso informed the Toronto Daily Star,
Ferrier could be excused for exceeding established limits since “there
were certain boys who had to be corrected and sometimes dealt with
severely in order to maintain discipline.”51
While Kelso remained unconvinced that violent corporal punishment
should be excluded from institutional practice, not everyone living in
Toronto at the time agreed. Since the early 1890s, Toronto’s Humane
48 AO, ISAT, RG 8–51–5, Series D, Miscellaneous, Report of the Commissioners, April 16, 1912.
49 “Was Youth Harshly Treated at Mimico Industrial Home?” Toronto Daily Star, February 26, 1912.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
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Society, with support from former mayor and VIS champion
W. H. Howland, had spearheaded a campaign to rid the city of cruelty
not only to children but also to animals.52 By the closing years of the nine-
teenth century, the abuse of children, the whipping of boys, and cruelty to
animals for the purposes of training were all considered, at least among
self-declared humanitarian elites, unacceptable. Thus it is not surprising
to find that contemporary newspaper reports and editorials revealed the
outrage many Toronto citizens must have felt about the allegations of
abuse at the VIS. More than one commentator was bothered by
Ferrier’s means of correction. Whips, chains, and starvation were not the
“instruments for the expulsion of evil from the human heart,” one anon-
ymous source commented in a 1912 newspaper article.53 Antiquated
means of punishment were more likely to break boys’ hearts so they
became “as wild beasts handled with whips and chains.”54 Presbyterian
minister Rev. J. D. Morrow agreed. In his mind, the VIS was supposed
to be a place of reform through humanitarian means, and such important
work could not “be left in the remote control of men who believe that boys
may be reformed by tying them up as beasts.”55
The use of physical violence to achieve rehabilitative ends was not what
many Progressive-era Toronto citizens had in mind when contemplating
effective training. According to one newspaper report, in a climate
where prison reformers were “devising humane ways and methods of
correcting grown criminals,” it seemed contradictory “to reserve its
chains for the little children.”56 Public opinion in Ontario, the report
continued, had steadily moved away from the “old and wrong notion
that harsh measures [we]re imperative” to maintain institutional
discipline.57 Although citizens of Toronto had initially considered the
VIS a site of reformation, newspaper reports and allegations of abuse
prompted calls for VIS officials to account for their violence. Indeed, by
the early 1900s, press reports had directed considerable attention to the
school in a manner that revealed its brutal underside.
As the Spain case increasingly became a public issue, other boys came
forward with similar accusations. Armed with these, the provincial
52 According to Jones and Rutman, the Humane Society was very energetic in its preventative efforts
to end the physical abuse and suffering of children. By hosting conferences, speaking to school
children, and distributing relevant literature, the Society attempted to ensure that the city’s
children and animals would receive more humane treatment. Andrew Jones and Leonard
Rutman, In the Children’s Aid: J. J. Kelso and Child Welfare in Ontario (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1981), p. 76.
53 “Pro-Bono Mimico,” Toronto World, March 3, 1912.
54 Ibid.
55 “Mimico School Inquiry by the City and Government,” Toronto World, February 28, 1912.
56 Ibid.
57 “Make the Investigation Thoro,” Toronto World, February 28, 1912.
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government agreed to assemble a committee to investigate Ferrier’s
administration. The provincial secretary ordered Dr. Bruce Smith to inves-
tigate charges of cruelty to inmates. Since the city of Toronto bore the
largest share of the expense in connection with the school, the council
argued that the city’s interests should be represented.58 As a result,
R. C. Harris and J. E. Starr (who was Toronto’s first juvenile court
judge) were appointed to join Dr. Smith. While the Spain case drew criti-
cal attention to the abuse of one VIS inmate, the team of provincial and
municipal representatives set out to locate evidence that VIS policy
relied on violence against boys. On February 29, 1912, the provincial
government passed a resolution that established an inquiry into conditions
of institutional life and overcrowding at the VIS.59
Unmoved by what secrets an investigation of his administration would
ultimately reveal, Ferrier boldly informed the VIS board of directors
that “he was not afraid of any investigation,” nor was he “ashamed of
his methods of management.”60 On the contrary, he declared, he had
never been overly harsh or cruel to any inmate. He, like McKinnon
before him, rationalized his actions by appealing to the greater good of
institutional order. Ferrier explained to a reporter from the Toronto
World that “[d]iscipline had to be maintained and [I] would maintain it
by [my] own judgment.” Moreover, he complained that the press was
painting one dimension of a very complicated picture. Ferrier countered
that, while he would not apologize for employing exceptional measures
to suppress conduct detrimental to institutional stability, he was not
unceasingly violent. On one occasion, he informed the reporter, an
escaped (anonymous) inmate was returned, forgiven, and told to find
something to eat.61
While Ferrier attempted to pass himself off as a sympathetic figure,
former residents publicly challenged that assessment. For instance,
Cecil’s parents were certain that a stint at the VIS would break him of
his idle and deviant conduct. While a resident for only five months, he
told the Toronto World a harrowing tale of his stay under Ferrier’s reign.
The former resident declared conditions inside the VIS so intolerable
that he would rather “commit suicide than return to the School.”
Reporters heard how Ferrier beat him and how attendants violently
knocked him down for trivial offences. During his stay Cecil had received
at least six severe whippings or “trimmings,” as he called them. On one
occasion after Cecil was caught smoking a cigarette, Ferrier made him
kneel with his arms resting over a chair. The superintendent then beat
58 “Mimico School Inquiry by the City and Government,” Toronto World, February 18, 1912.
59 “Pro-Bono Mimico,” Toronto World, March 3, 1912.
60 “Superintendent Ferrier Not Afraid of Any Investigation,” Toronto World, February 29, 1912.
61 Ibid.
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him upon his naked back using a piece of tug-strap with a force so severe
as to leave behind cuts and welts.62 Other former residents detailed similar
tales.63 A resident of three years, who preferred to remain anonymous,
informed the Toronto World that he had run away twice from the insti-
tution. On his return, the anonymous inmate reported, Ferrier “laid him
over a chair, put his knee on the small of his back and beat him with a
strap.”64
Abuses experienced by Wilbert, Cecil, and the anonymous informant
were not confined to Ferrier’s administration. Former superintendent
McKinnon freely admitted such techniques were central to maintaining
an orderly institution. He informed the Toronto World that there were
boys at the VIS who were like the “wild horses of the west.” McKinnon
saw no harm in chaining up a boy overnight who had attempted to run
from the facility. “When a boy got the idea in his head that he would
run away,” McKinnon reasoned, “the only way to get it out was to tie
him up for a few days so that he could not run away and that would get
the idea out of his head.” Attempting to rationalize his and Ferrier’s
actions, the former superintendent continued,”You know, there are boys
out there who are crazy. They may be just crazy.”65 McKinnon thus
attempted to exculpate himself and Ferrier by shifting the burden of
blame to recalcitrant and exceptional inmates. Rather than acknowledge
full responsibility, McKinnon, as was his practice when called to account,
supplied the public with what he considered an effective means through
which to shift accountability for the charges.
On February 29, the commission appointed to probe Ferrier’s adminis-
tration formally commenced proceedings in a VIS schoolroom set aside for
the occasion. Ferrier could only sit and listen while Mrs. Spain explained
the suffering her son had endured. A horrified gasp ran throughout the
room as she recounted how she came upon her son’s beaten body strapped
to a bed. When she reached her son, Mrs. Spain said, Wilbert faintly
queried, “Ain’t I gettin’ skinny, mother?”66 To corroborate his mother’s
testimony, Wilbert was next to testify. According to newspaper reports,
62 “Would Rather Kill Himself Than Go Back to Mimico,” Toronto World, March 2, 1912.
63 This discussion is not meant to accept uncritically Cecil’s and the anonymous resident’s versions of
events. Indeed, there are many reasons to be sceptical: for one, the boys might have been speaking to
the press out of vengeance. Whether their accounts are fabrications is impossible to determine from
the historical record.
64 “Boy Was Seen at St. John’s School with Heavy Iron around his Leg,” Toronto World, March 5, 1912.
This informant said he was prepared to swear to his story before the commission if his name was
withheld from publication. His reason for not wanting his name revealed was that his wife and
mother-in-law were unaware he had been a VIS inmate.
65 “Believes in Strapping Boys and Has Handcuffed Them!” Toronto World, February, 29, 1912.
66 “Superintendent of Mimico Admits that Boys Were Handcuffed and Put on Bread and Water Diet,”
Toronto World, March 1, 1912.
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he appeared a slight lad of 14 years, and the natural softness of his voice
added to the drama his testimony produced.67 Wilbert supposed that he
had been bad for running away, but not so bad as to deserve such
severe penalty. He recalled the superintendent saying: “I suppose we
had better chain you up for a while.” After he identified the handcuffs
from among the exhibits, Dr. Smith asked Wilbert whether they were
cold. Wilbert’s weak reply was: “Sometimes, sir.” During his weeks of con-
finement the irons were removed only twice: on one occasion so he could
read to 40 other boys for an hour, and on another to allow him to take a
bath. Weakened by confinement and physical violence, he was forced to
crawl around in a meagre attempt to cleanse himself. Some staff had diffi-
culty accepting Wilbert’s punishment, however. Mrs. Sherrick, a matron at
the VIS, testified she had brought him milk, cake, and meat when con-
ditions allowed her to go undetected.68 Andrew Gordon, the carpentry
instructor and officer in charge of Wilbert during his punishment, had
sent boys to play with him when Ferrier was absent.69
Ferrier took the stand toward the close of the five-hour session. When
asked about the validity of allegations levelled against him and his staff,
Ferrier confirmed they were substantially correct, but attempted to
absolve himself by appealing to the greater good of an orderly institution
and the challenge posed by exceptional boys.70 He maintained that boys
who were almost impossible to handle responded only to the harshest
penalties. Ferrier admitted to punishing another boy by giving him a
diet of bread and water over the course of 60 days, but was certain the
meagre diet alone was insufficient punishment. Ferrier therefore had
coupled this penalty with shackles and the strap. He was convinced that
the tripartite strategy of shackles, the strap, and a diet of bread and
water was the “only effective method of making bad boys good.”
Handcuffs, Ferrier went on to say, were the only way to prevent obstinate
boys from escaping. In response to Ferrier’s testimony, Dr. Bruce Smith
retorted such practices were forbidden in asylums, even for the most
violent “maniacs.”71
Given the evidence presented, we would not be wrong to expect that the
Commission had conclusively denounced the superintendent. Surprisingly,
it did nothing of the sort. Instead of outright condemnation of Ferrier
for employing violence to maintain institutional equilibrium, the
Commission’s report offered several rationales for its use.72 That a
67 “Last of Leg Irons Seen at Industrial School,” Toronto Daily Star, March 5, 1912.
68 Ibid.
69 “Superintendent of Mimico Admits that Boys Were Handcuffed and Put on Bread and Water Diet,”
Toronto World, March 1, 1912.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 AO, ISAT, RG 8–51–5, Miscellaneous, Report of the Commissioners, April 16, 1912.
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private board of governors managed the VIS was among the reasons given
to excuse Ferrier’s actions. The Board of Education for Toronto under the
Industrial Schools Act had allowed a private board to assemble and admin-
ister an institution where discipline was entirely in the hands of the super-
intendent. According to the Commissioners, this fact probably
“explain[ed] the situation.”73 Poking fun at and revealing the inadequacy
of the Industrial Schools Board, Jack Canuck, a muckraking people’s
paper, offered the following exchange:
Mr. Citizen: “Is the institution to blame?”
Jack Canuck: “Not altogether.”
Mr. Citizen: “Is the Board to Blame?”
Jack Canuck: “Very Likely.”
Mr. Citizen: “What is a Board?”
Jack Canuck: “Lumber.”74
Although the Commissioners seemed unwilling to criticize Ferrier and the
abusive practices of his staff overtly, Jack Canuck was not so pensive. In
response to the question, “was the system of punishment in use at the
VIS fit and proper?” the anonymous commentator replied:
Whippings till the flesh was bruised. Bread and water diet. Manacles. These
three things were plainly shown to have been in vogue at the Mimico school.
Were they a necessary part of such a school’s code of correction? A thousand
times, No! If we are going to make our boys despise the society that is endea-
voring to reform them we must chain them to bedposts, flog them as sailors
used to be flogged in the navy and feed them with plainer fare than we throw
our dogs.75
Not only were the board of management and former superintendents
blamed for the degeneration of the VIS programme; Commissioners
found the inmates to be equally censurable, if not more so. They convinced
themselves that some of the boys were so far out of control that few options
beyond violent penalties remained feasible. Over time, Ferrier became con-
vinced that the inmates housed in the institution had become increasingly
unmanageable. These were not the truant boys and first-time offenders
whom the VIS was originally intended to house. Its initial purpose was to
provide for truant boys under 14 years of age who, for various reasons,
could not be induced to attend school while under their parents’ care. It
was not intended to be either a prison or a reformatory and had never
73 Ibid.
74 “Mimico Revelations,” Jack Canuck, March 9, 1912, p. 18.
75 Ibid.
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been provided with resources for such a purpose. Yet, according to the
Commissioners, the administration was being asked to work as if it had.
Howland and the other reform-minded individuals had intended to create
an industrial school that would prevent boys from becoming criminals.
However, as Paul Bennett has similarly suggested, various forces, such as
the closure of Penetanguishene Reformatory in 1904, the passage of the
Gibson Act that made provisions for J. J. Kelso’s appointment as
Superintendent of Neglected and Dependent Children, and the emergence
of Toronto’s Juvenile Court in 1912, all contributed to the VIS housing a
greater number of troublesome offenders.76
The Commissioners concluded that those for whom the institution had
initially been established had been displaced. Boys demonstrating
vicious propensities (who before 1904 would have been incarcerated at
the Penetanguishene Reformatory) and the feeble-minded (for whom
few institutional provisions existed) were brought into contact with
others whose worst fault was the result of improper home training or
inadequate supervision (see Tables 1 and 2). For their part, the
Commissioners concluded that, without a proper system of ordering the
different classes of offenders, the VIS administration and its inaugural
goals of reform, prevention, and cultivating self-control were severely
and irreparably compromised.77
Justifying violence through appeals to exceptional inmates completes
the shift in locating blame. Those accused, instead of shouldering blame,
effectively bridge the gap between action and causation by displacing it
onto the unsuspecting, and silent, victim. If the boys were not so violent
or exceptional, the disagreeable conduct of superintendents would not
have been necessary in the first instance. Accountability flows not from
the one accused, but from the victim on behalf of whom the charge was
levelled. In response to a charge, VIS officials thus (re)constructed their
deeds by demonstrating how violence did not originate in themselves,
but in the ones to whom it was meted out. Thus, in an appeal to a state
of emergency, the actions of the exceptional inmates were constructed as
demanding a trial, not those of the officials who were merely attempting
to preserve institutional order. Such a course is a remarkably fecund jus-
tification for violence: the state of emergency is soaked in violence
turned back against a seemingly deserving Other.
“What would my unfriendly critics do with these boys?”
No one could have anticipated that a card addressed on May 28, 1926, to
the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa would spark a year-long series
of events. The card was simple, to the point, but infinitely powerful.
76 Ibid. On this point, see also Bennett, “Taming Bad Boys of the Dangerous Class.”
77 AO, ISAT, RG 8–51–5, Miscellaneous, Report of the Commissioners, April 16, 1912.
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It read: “Dear Honored Sir: Please look into the abuse of the Boys at
Industrial School, Mimico near Toronto.”78 Signed by George Heath of
Toronto, the card advised, “please go when not expected.” Heath, an
unknown character, was privy to mysterious circumstances surrounding
the death of inmate “Jason Brown” from either a first-hand account or
hearsay evidence. According to a Department of Justice ledger entry,
this note was acknowledged and forwarded to the provincial Attorney
General of Ontario (W. H. Price) on May 31, 1926.79
On closer inspection, Jason Brown turned out to be inmate James
Brawn who had died in the VIS amid more than suspicious circumstances.
As a matter of law, a coroner’s inquiry was required whenever a resident in
a house of correction died. At this hearing, James’s father testified to the
outrage he harboured toward the School. As an infuriated father incensed
by the improper treatment of his son, Mr. Brawn heaped a tirade of abuse
on VIS officials and staff.80 He criticized the VIS’s abuse of corporal
punishment, solitary confinement, and poor treatment of the boys. As
his outburst had little to do with this routine investigation, he was cut
short. A confused jury curiously concluded that James had died of blood
poisoning.81 The jury’s finding was just the beginning, however, of a
series of events that would end with a former staff member making
public the atrocities inmates suffered.
Table 2: VIS Inmate Populations, 1887–1917
Year Number of inmates
1887 50
1890 146
1899 129
1902 160
1906 207
1909 241
1913 300
1917 300
Source: The evidence given for these years is
representative of the information presented
in the VIS Annual Reports, 1898–1917. See
also Bennett, “Taming Bad Boys,” p. 81.
78 AO. Department of the Attorney General Files, RG 4–32–1410/1926, Investigation of the VIS.
79 Ibid., W. H. Price to Ferrier, May 31, 1926. See also Bennett (“Taming Bad Boys,” p. 90), which has a
brief discussion of this incident.
80 AO, Department of the Attorney General Files, RG 4–32–1410/1926, Investigation of the VIS,
A. C. Baiden to A. M. Middleton, June 11, 1926.
81 AO, Department of the Attorney General Files, RG 4–32–1410/1926, Investigation of the VIS, copy
of evidence taken at Memorial Hall, Mimico, May 26, 1926.
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Heath was not the only confused and interested party. Following the
inquest, the Attorney General’s office had become acutely aware of a
number of inconsistencies and irregularities evident in the coroner’s
report. First, the attending physician and the coroner undertaking the inves-
tigation were associates. Dr. A. D. Roberts had attended to James during his
illness, and Dr. A. C. Baiden, who presided over the inquest, was his
partner. More enigmatic still is that the pair had performed the postmortem
investigation together. The intimate association of the two medical officials
involved in James Brawn’s case created, at best, a conflict of interest.
Although not enshrined in law, the established practice was that the
coroner should be absolutely impartial in matters of this kind.82 Clearly,
Baiden had a vested interest in the case and should have recused himself.
Secondly, although the Crown attorney for the region typically attended
the coroner’s inquest, the Crown was not represented at the inquiry into
James’s death. When asked for an explanation, Baiden indicated he con-
sidered the inquest only an informal gathering with no criminal aspect
to consider, which “was only necessary because the boy had died while
in a house of correction.”83 Therefore, he thought, a crown attorney
need not be present. Baiden’s account, however, did little to lift the veil
shrouding the inquest.84
Heath’s card, the irregularities in the coroner’s report, and Mr. Brawn’s
outburst left too many questions surrounding James’s death unanswered.
The cloud hanging over the VIS was further darkened by allegations of
the improper treatment of boys from Toronto’s Big Brother Movement
(among others), which was closely linked to the juvenile court and was pri-
marily concerned with the prevention of adolescent male delinquency.
Visitors to the VIS, like Sam Harris of the Toronto Big Brother movement,
were intimately aware of the suffering inmates often endured. On a recent
visit while he sat observing the boys, Harris ruminated about whether the
dismal conditions of their institutional lives were in any way uplifting. The
boys, he informed the Attorney General for Ontario, were “sloppy, dirty
and herded,” and there was “not the high standard of handling good for
development of character in boys.”85
After a considerable period had passed, the Brawns still had received
only sparse information related to their son’s death. In response, they
assembled a list of charges levelled against the VIS. The 16 allegations
included: that James had been locked in his room while ill, that boys
82 AO, Department of the Attorney General Files, RG 4–32–1410/1926, Investigation of the VIS,
P. Anderson to A. N. Middleton, July 7, 1926.
83 AO, Department of the Attorney General Files, RG 4–32–1410/1926, Investigation of the VIS,
A. C. Baiden to A. M. Middleton, June 11, 1926.
84 Ibid.
85 AO, Department of the Attorney General Files, RG 4–32–1410/1926, Investigation of the VIS,
Harris to W. H. Price, March 31, 1927.
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worked nights under compulsion, that discourtesy had been given to
James’s mother, that boys were given bad-smelling soup when sick, and
that the food was generally unsuitable. Although the Brawns’ charges con-
cerned their son’s treatment specifically, these would have far-reaching
effects. The Brawns’ most significant charge involved extreme use of
violent corporal punishment. Perhaps this time complaints concerning
boys’ violent treatment would be heard and acted upon.86
With the task of investigating the death of James Brawn, an informal
committee of Toronto city aldermen was appointed and began hearing evi-
dence on March 23, 1927, with deputy superintendent William E. Pettinger
being the first to testify.87 When asked what punishments institutional staff
commonly used, he replied that a “walk the line” approach was often
employed. A confused panel of aldermen asked Pettinger to explain.
According to his testimony, offending boys were ceremoniously paraded
in a line for an hour to an hour and a half around a tree or about the gym-
nasium. In an hour, the deputy superintendent proudly concluded, some
boys could cover several miles. While compliant inmates were dismissed
after the prescribed time, boys who “goofed off” would walk until the
task was performed according to the deputy superintendent’s exacting
standards. A curious variation of “walk the line” was walking like a
bear. When asked about this tactic, Pettinger responded slowly and delib-
erately. Boys would sometimes be made to walk around the campus on
their palms and feet. He maintained that the position of the body and
the lumbering side-to-side that resulted closely resembled a bear’s gait.88
Furthermore, for careless disrespect of attendants — conspicuous in boys
who failed to hold their heads up and observe staff directly — obdurate
inmates suffered having their noses squeezed. In some cases the pinch was
sufficient to draw blood. Although Pettinger denied he ever squeezed till
blood ran down boys’ faces, he did admit that such a technique was an excel-
lent deterrent. He explained himself by claiming that boys would certainly
remember the lesson. Next, the Committee raised the issue of strapping
boys. The deputy superintendent’s testimony revealed that inmates were rou-
tinely whipped for causing a disturbance in their dormitories. At times, more
than one attendant was involved in punishing inmates. Although Pettinger
denied allegations that staff took each other’s places when their arms grew
tired from whipping, he did admit his staff often teamed up to inflict penalty.89
Solitary confinement was the next item on the investigators’ agenda.
Pettinger initially denied the practice was in use at the institution. The
86 AO, Department of the Attorney General Files, RG 4–32–1410/1926, Investigation of the VIS,
Memorandum, April 19, 1927.
87 “Punishment System Included Bear Walk,” Toronto Daily Star, March 24, 1927.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
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aldermen, who had received conflicting reports from the Brawns, pushed
the issue further. Eventually Pettinger recanted. Although he had been
truthful about the solitary room having been discontinued, the punishment
had remained in full use until two weeks before the investigation. When
pressed for further details, Pettinger testified boys remained in the room
for a week or two to “cool off.” Formerly a bedroom, the solitary room
was entirely devoid of furniture except for a set of springs Pettinger
referred to as a mattress.90
A great deal of public scrutiny surrounded the aldermen’s investigation.
Many prominent citizens of Toronto took the occasion publicly to
condemn the institution. Mayor Thomas Foster, for example, described
the punishments as ridiculous. “That is not discipline,” the mayor stated.
“There’s something wrong there.”91 After hearing the allegations, others
wanted formal sanctions brought against the staff. For his part,
Provincial Secretary Lincoln Goldie was equally upset by the Brawns’ alle-
gations. If the accusations were true, he thought VIS staff should be sent to
jail and could hardly “conceive of any human being such a brute.”92
Not all commentators were as critical as the Provincial Secretary. On the
eve of a press frenzy, Forbes Godfrey, the Minister of Health and Labour,
came to the defence of the VIS staff. Having served on the Industrial
School Association Board for over 35 years, he was aware of the difficulties
VIS officials confronted. Instead of receiving the mountain of what he con-
sidered unfair criticism, Godfrey thought the staff should be commended
for their great work. Invoking the “state of exception” justification,
Godfrey informed the Toronto Daily Star’s reporter, “they are not hand-
ling the good boys of the province.” He was certain the boys detained at
the school were handpicked bad boys and informed the reporter that
Pettinger had been shot in the side by an inmate and still suffered from
the injuries. Clearly, given the general unruliness, Godfrey was convinced
that VIS staff should be entitled to the odd indiscretion. He maintained,
“All this sob-sister stuff is unfair, unreasonable and unjust.”93
Curiously, Ferrier was not called to testify. Intent on being heard, he
instead produced a detailed written response to the Brawns’ allegations.
In his response, Ferrier accounted for any perceived wrongdoing by
spotlighting institutional order and inmates’ depraved disposition:
What punishment should be given a boy of 18 years who entered his Cottage
and violently assaulted the young Matron? What for a boy who shot his
90 Ibid.
91 “Mayor Doesn’t Approve of Punishments Given at Industrial School,” Toronto Daily Star, March 24,
1927.
92 “Suggests Jail Term for Boys’ Abusers,” Toronto Daily Star, March 25, 1927.
93 “Dr. Godfrey Defends Staff at Mimico,” Toronto Daily Star, March 25, 1927.
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officer? This officer is still suffering from this dastardly deed. What for a boy
who deliberately assaulted his officer when his back was turned? What for
the boy who upsets the discipline of the School by constant plotting at
escape? What would my unfriendly critics do with these boys? A short
term in detention is not harsh punishment for them.94
In Ferrier’s estimation, boys who escaped, used filthy language, caused dif-
ficulty for staff, or committed violent acts inside the institution begged for
more than the usual amount of pain. By way of conclusion, Ferrier assured
his accusers that boys received no undue severity in punishment. Besides,
Ferrier explained, some of the discipline meted out for wayward conduct
was actually good for the boys. Walking in line for brief periods, for
example, might be considered beneficial exercise. Ferrier was convinced
his methods were justified, but conceded that he and his staff were
human and “apt to err at times and make mistakes.”95
The Committee of Aldermen agreed. On April 4, 1927, the city council
adopted the investigators’ informal report and voted 15 to 7 against further
inquiry. Although James Brawn contracted his fatal illness while in the
institution, the Committee contended he had not died as a result of
severe punishment.96 A few city council members called the Brawns irre-
sponsible. “This thing is ridiculous,” Alderman Carrick argued. The
council had “allowed their sympathy to run ahead of their good sense in
allowing this to come before council.”97 The entire investigation, he contin-
ued, was a complete misappropriation of taxpayers’ money. At the close of
the inquiry, Alderman Phillips remarked the reports were all “Bunk.”98
In the shadows lurked an individual who was anxious to weave a tale of
inmate’s abuse that contradicted Phillips’s conclusion. This individual had
witnessed first-hand the staff severely and unnecessary beating boys. After
Toronto city council unceremoniously dismissed the issue, A. J. Scott, a
former night-attendant, came forward. In a 16-page document Scott
attempted to relieve himself of a burden he had carried since he began
work at the institution.99 With a guilty conscience and Christian
94 AO, Department of the Attorney General Files, RG 4–32–1410/1926, Investigation of the VIS.
95 Ibid.
96 “Industrial School Probe Turned Down,” Toronto Daily Star, April 5, 1927.
97 Ibid.
98 AO, Department of the Attorney General Files, RG 4–32–1410/1926, Investigation of the VIS.
99 Several hypothetical reasons may be offered for Scott’s acrimony: he might have been fired, or he
may have personally disliked Ferrier. There is some evidence to suggest that his Christian
exhortations got him into trouble with the School’s administration on at least one occasion. A
guard reported to Ferrier that Scott had attempted to convert Jewish residents to Christianity.
Instead of demonstrating contrition, Scott argued he would continue to bear witness to the work
of Christ to non-Christians. To be true to the word of God, Scott argued, there was only one
course open to him. In a letter to Ferrier, Scott maintained, “Jesus says in Mark 16:15 ‘Go ye
into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature.’ He also says in John 14:21 ‘He that
170 Histoire sociale / Social History
compassion for the boys, Scott came forward to unburden his mind and
confess all the institution’s sins.100
Scott started his first shift at the VIS on December 27, 1919. By his
second shift he had witnessed what would be the first of many instances
of staff violence during his career. Arriving at his post, he was greeted
by what he considered a rather bothersome sight. Rounding the corner
he “saw an officer beat a small boy . . . unjustly.” Observing this incident
made Scott physically ill and served as a quick lesson that the official
book of rules was not the law staff observed. Instead, VIS officials
crafted and adhered to their own code of conduct that varied significantly
from official policy.101
Another moral difficulty for Scott was that Ferrier seemingly condoned
abuses boys suffered at the hands of his staff. On several occasions, Scott
had informed the superintendent, both in writing and verbally, about the
cruelty he observed. Invariably, no action would be taken. For example,
one fateful evening, Scott found two small boys kneeling on the floor
holding their hands above their heads. After what had seemed like
hours to the boys involved, when he came upon the scene, they begged
and pleaded to be allowed to turn in for the night. Finding the cottage
attendant had retired for the evening, Scott told the boys to get into bed
quickly. Disturbed by the previous evening’s events, he informed Ferrier
about what he had observed. To his surprise, the superintendent severely
reprimanded Scott for his concern. Ferrier, it seems, had a don’t-ask-don’t-
tell policy regarding staff abuse of inmates.102 Clearly, he chose to overlook
his staff’s brutality or, like his own violence, found ways to rationalize it.
On still another occasion, Scott arrived to find attendants mistreating
several boys. At the start of his shift, Scott entered the cottage and was
greeted by the sounds of officers beating boys in the upstairs dormitory.
He waited until one of the responsible attendants descended the stairs.
The apparently triumphant staff member beamed he had “licked the
whole bunch of them.” Other violent penalties perpetrated by the staff
hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me.’ So I refuse to disobey His
command. I realize what it may mean, for me to take the stand I am taking, but my purpose in
my heart, [is] to be true to God.” AO, RG 8–51–3, Administrative Correspondence, Scott to
Ferrier, December 2, 1922.
100 AO, Department of the Attorney General Files, RG 4–32–1410/1926, Investigation of the VIS,
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Charges Before Council”) and May 17 (Some Industrial School Inmates Unmercifully Beaten”).
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were, if it is possible to believe, much more callous. In a cold rain and with
slush on the ground, the same triumphant officer punished boys by making
them lie on the sidewalk. When they were sufficiently soaked, the officer
gave the command, “other side” for the boys to roll over.103
According to Scott, “Ferrier and others knew that these are facts.”104 The
VIS correspondence files corroborate that abuse went on with Ferrier’s
sanction. Scott stated:
I believe Mr. Ferrier you know that Mr. I is not reliable, but I have some-
times wondered if you knew the kind of a man he is. Do you know that he
swears before the Boys, and tells smutty things about women, and gives
boys Tobacco, and asks Boys to steal for him. Mr. F told me that Mr. I got
a team from him and some Boys to go and haul some Brick. And I under-
stand it was after they hauled the Brick, he took the team and had the
Boys help him steal new ties from the Railway.105
Moreover, in his “confession” Scott revealed that Pettinger had misled the
commission investigating the death of James Brawn. While the deputy
superintendent denied boys were punished by having their noses
pinched until bloody or were hit with sticks or missed meals, Scott
argued that all of these forms of violence were common. Recalling
Ferrier’s rhetorical question about what the proper punishment would
be for a boy who deliberately assaulted an officer when his back was
turned, Scott revealed that the superintendent had neglected to mention
that, a few minutes previously, the victimized officer had punched the
offending inmate in the jaw.106
Scott further reported that, for the crime of disrupting class or using
filthy language, boys were held down and beaten until staff grew fatigued.
In an effort to cover up the abuse, the night-watchman claimed attendants
would “wash the blood off him and put him in detention.” On another
eventful evening when Scott arrived for work, a member of the day staff
greeted him at the door of cottage number 6 and asked him to wait
outside. Curious about what was occurring inside, yet not wanting to be
detected, he quietly entered the cottage. He heard officers violently attack-
ing a boy in the dressing room above. From the sounds he could discern
the boy was kneeling by a bench and being struck on the back. After
every stroke, the boy yelled out in pain. After a long period of abuse,
the victim could barely muster the energy to emit a groan. Some of the
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
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boys who were huddled in their beds during the ordeal had counted over
100 strikes. After the beating, the victim was thrown into detention until
the evidence of extreme brutality had healed. Why was he treated so ruth-
lessly? He had been found using tobacco.107
It was not, however, Scott’s report or another public scandal involving
inmate abuse that ultimately brought about the closure of the VIS.
Rather, it was a scathing report released by the Ontario government in
1930 that condemned the VIS as an outmoded institution.108 The commis-
sioners concluded, “The conditions at Mimico should no longer be toler-
ated.”109 The Minister of Public Welfare concurred and in December
1934 finally closed the school’s doors.
Conclusion
Repeated probes into VIS punishment practices and Scott’s revelations
expose how violence and brutality were braided with institutional policy.
It seems that the VIS was a world of concrete and shadows, wherein
many boys resided in fear. This ethos stands in contradistinction to the offi-
cial narrative VIS officials communicated. Theoretically, the school was to
reform bad boys through a combination of patient and deliberate disci-
pline. However, when institutional or normative order was threatened by
obstinate inmates, returning the VIS to a state of equilibrium eclipsed
all other concerns.
According to VIS officials, while violence was fundamental to insti-
tutional governance, such extreme measures were easily rationalized.
Severe penalty was necessary, staff rationalized, to counter illicit sexual
contact, running away, violation of rules, and disrespect, as well as to main-
tain institutional order — among other reasons. Such virulence was swiftly
answered with thrashing, “trimming,” tethering, hitting, pinching, punch-
ing, and other similar forms of violence. When agents outside the VIS
demanded explanations, however, such abuse was rationalized through
accounts intended to absolve the accused of responsibility. These accounts
recognized complicity in inmate suffering, but circumvented demands from
parents, advocates, and the public for staff to take responsibility by
successfully persuading investigators that inmates should instead be
denounced. Demand for responsibility came full circle: victims were com-
plicit in their torment. As opposed to receiving redress for severe infliction
of pain, inmates were inculpated.
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Instead of earning near universal obloquy from the public and investiga-
tive committees for their loathsome treatment of boys, superintendents
were largely defended and, at times, lauded by sympathetic observers.
Representatives of the wider society who were asked to investigate unof-
ficial methods of control in large part failed to criticize these strategies
and even applauded those that offered a means through which to maintain
order among bad boys. The likely result of the Commission’s reluctance to
indict VIS staff for their violent practices was to buttress their use.
Commissioners’ seeming indifference, therefore, confirmed the use of
violent punishments as a legitimate part of institutional governance.
Nevertheless, before I, too, fall into the trap of providing a convenient
alibi for VIS officials, it is important to maintain that institutional officials
carry a heavy burden for inmates’ hardship and torment. No matter the
tenability or veracity of their accounts, we should never allow such
performance to obfuscate responsibility.
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